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Transnational corporations are not a new phenomenon. 1 The extension of economic activities across national borders since the end of World War II caused transnational corporations to spread to an extent capable of significantly affecting societal matters. This development did not go unnoticed in academic discussions. Transnational corporations have been of major scientific interest since the 1960s. Stephen Hymer, an early pioneer in this area, analyzed the organizational mechanisms of multinational corporations. 2 The exploding number and size of private enterprises on a global scale mesmerized many authors, who called such enterprises "cosmocorps" 3 and "a challenge to the nation-state." 4 In the early 1970s, authors like Raymond Vernon in his book, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises, 5 and Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal article, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," 6 were at the forefront of questioning the fundamental relationship between nation-states and transnational organizations. By the early 1990s, the importance of transnational corporations vis-à-vis nation-states as influential actors on the international level had already been clearly stated. 7 So why revisit a subject already discussed in the 1970s today? Because the world has seen enormous change over the last few decades, which has affected the role of transnational corporations in what is now perceived as a globalized society. While Huntington claimed in the early 1970s that transnationalism-as opposed to European colonialism-is the "American mode of expansion," 8 and many economists thought that transnational corporations were in fact national corporations with international business activities, 9 others predicted that in the future there would be no national products, technologies, corporations, or industries, but only global economics. 10 In 1990, for instance, Kenichi Ohmae stated: "In today's 'Interlinked Economy,' global corporations have effectively become nationalityless." 11 In fact, in 2011 we witness not only an era with more, bigger, and increasingly influential transnational corporations than any time before (see section II), but also 4. Daniel Jay Baum, The Global Corporation: An American Challenge to the NationState?, 55 IOWA L. REV. 410, 410 (1969) .
5. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971) . Vernon describes this piece as portraying "an incipient clash between two strong systems-a system of nation-states responding to the imperatives of its citizens, and a system of enterprises reacting to the increasing opportunities induced by technological change." Raymond Vernon, This Week's Citation Classic, CURRENT CONTENTS: SOC. & BEHAV. SCI., no. 3, Jan. 21, 1985 (book review of SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 1971) . Vernon contends that this class "could prove destructive if an international response to the clash [is] not developed." Id.
6. Samuel P. Huntington, Transnational Organizations in World Politics, 25 WORLD POL. 333 (1973) (analyzing "the sources, nature, and dynamics" of the transnational revolution and speculating on "its implications for politics at the national and international level"). an era when these corporations' de facto independency from a certain nation-state as their home base is growing (see section III).
A further examination is also needed because the analysis of transnational corporations from a specifically legal perspective remains underdeveloped. Whereas numerous economic contributions treat the inner structure of transnational corporations, 12 law scholars largely focus on the external relationships of the corporation and regulatory issues like supervision, taxation, or liability. 13 It is remarkable that even the most important economic standard literature on transnational corporations is hardly taken into account in the legal discourse. Alan Rugman, author of the seminal book, Inside the Multinationals: The Economics of Internal Markets, notes that since its publication in 1981 the book has been cited 215 times in academic scholarship-but only three times in legal contributions. 14 In legal discourse, the corporation was originally treated as an object regulated by nation-states; its inner functioning remained out of focus. More recent legal publications have differentiated the role of the corporation in more detail. Particularly, the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) has boomed over the last decades. 15 This debate was accompanied by literature on the treatment of transnational corporations under international law 16 and the role of corporations as legislators of their own legal regimes. 17 However, these branches of research treat only follow-up problems; further research is needed in order to better understand the inner functioning of the transnational corporation. The merits of specific legal discourses, like the CSR debate, could be expounded if legal scholars were better able to understand the corporation itself as the starting point of concerns about its responsibility. From this perspective, the recent debate over transnational corporate governance points in the right direction. 18 In order to set the stage for the discussion in the following contributions, the remainder of this introduction briefly addresses three issues control is exercised on the basis of economic dependency. 20 Particularly in modern knowledge-based industries, flexibility is a more vital factor than the control of assets. 21 In terms of the classical dichotomy of market and firm established by transaction cost economics, the modern transnational corporation is situated as a hybrid between these two extremes, employing governance mechanisms from both sides. 22 Therefore, new approaches to defining transnational corporations are often quite general. According to the Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises released by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, multinational enterprises usually comprise companies or other entities established in more than one country and so linked that they may co-ordinate their operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another. 23 The essential feature here is the ability of one or several corporate units to control the others, no matter whether their links are arranged by means of equity shares or by contract only. AND CLARIFICATIONS 12 (2008) , available at http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3746,en_2649_34889_2397532 _1_1_1_1,00.html (click "English" hyperlink in middle of page); see also DUNNING & LUNDAN, supra note 12, at 3 ("A multinational or transnational enterprise is an enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) and owns or, in some way, controls value-added activities in more than one country.").
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
In the nineteenth century, transnational corporations were already influential actors in world trade. 24 However, their importance has risen dramatically, especially since the 1980s. According to the World Investment Report 2009, which is published by the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), there are currently about 82,000 transnational corporations worldwide, with 810,000 foreign affiliates. 25 "These companies play a major and growing role in the world economy. For example, exports by foreign affiliates of [transnational corporations] are estimated to account for about one third of total world exports of goods and services." 26 This share is even larger if one includes the nonequity relationships of transnational corporations with companies in their supply or distribution chain, over which the former exert de facto control due to existing economic dependency. The number of employees of transnational corporations worldwide was estimated at about 77 million in 2008-more than double the total labor force of Germany. 27 The impact of transnational corporations on world trade is further demonstrated by the growth of foreign direct investment (FDI). As the World Investment Report 2009 illustrates, the total annual amount of FDI has risen dramatically over the last few decades. While in 1980 the global aggregate of FDI inflows added up to approximately $50 billion, it amounted to about $200 billion in 1990 and $1,400 billion in 2000. 28 In 2007, it reached a record high of $1,979 billion before falling to $1,697 billion in 2008. 29 As a result of the financial crisis, a further downturn was estimated for 2009. 30 However, the next record high should accompany the current economic recovery. 
III. MEASURING THE TRANSNATIONALITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
The importance of transnational corporations is, however, not only a question of quantity, but also of quality. Consequently, academics should be concerned, not with the size and number of transnational corporations or their share in global trade, but with the extent to which they act as "footloose" actors who cannot be associated with a certain nation-state as their home base. So what are the criteria according to which the transnationality of a corporation can be measured? The UNCTAD regularly presents its "transnationality index," which is calculated as the average of the following three ratios: "foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales, and foreign employment to total employment." 31 Thus, the crucial factors are seen in the location of assets, sales, and employment. Moreover, one can add factors like the nationality of the board of directors and shareholders, the focus on global markets, and incorporation under a supranational charter.
Indeed, the transnationality of the world's top 100 nonfinancial transnational corporations (ranked by foreign assets) has been accelerating during the last two decades. A comparison of data from the 1990s with recent data reveals a clear trend toward the transnationalization of corporations. 32 Take General Electric, the company with the largest amount of foreign assets worldwide. 33 While General Electric's share of foreign assets to total assets was roughly 10% in 1990, 34 it rose to about 53% in 2007. 35 General Electric's total transnationality index rose from 15% in 1990 36 to more than 51% in 2007. 37 The same trend can be observed with British Petroleum (now BP), number four in foreign assets worldwide, 38 index of roughly 25% in 1990, 42 when it was almost exclusively focused on the Japanese home market. However, in 2007, Toyota's transnationality index had risen to almost 52%, 43 a clear tendency toward a global orientation. These single observations are backed by the general trend in the development of the UNCTAD transnationality index for these top 100 corporations, which shows an average rise from roughly 47% in 1993 to roughly 62% in 2006. 44 While the UNCTAD transnationality index measures the ratio of foreign employment to total employment, an even better indicator for the "footlooseness" of a corporation may be the nationality of its top management and board of directors. Whereas transnational companies used to be almost exclusively run by managers from their home state, today's boards of directors have become increasingly international. It is reported that "inpatriates"-managers from foreign parts of the corporation-are increasingly forming part of a globalized management structure. 45 An analysis by the consulting agency Simon-Kucher & Partners of the German corporations listed in the German stock index DAX 30 shows a clear trend within the last decade. 46 Allianz enlarged its share of foreigners on the board of directors from 0% in 2000 to 40% by the middle of 2009. 47 Siemens experienced a rise from 0% to 38% within the same period. 48 In total, the ratio of foreigners on the boards of the top thirty German corporations rose from 13.3% in 2000 to 26.3% in 2008. 49 While one might argue that a share of a bit more than a quarter is still a sign of the dominance of national managers, the general trend is the interesting aspect: Within eight years, the share of foreigners almost doubled.
Another factor is the nationality of shareholders. Here, the trend toward a larger proportion of international ownership is fuelled by 42 54 If one compares the prospect of the Asian market for motor vehicles to the European one, this decision is not surprising. In January 2009, while Volkswagen sold 83,900 vehicles in China, only 53,300 vehicles were sold on the German home market. 55 Another criterion is the development with regard to the countries that host the headquarters of the largest companies worldwide. If one examines recent data on the "Fortune Global 500"-the biggest firms worldwide in terms of revenue-an interesting trend appears. Whereas the largest companies used to be rooted almost exclusively within the so-called "triad"-namely North America, Western Europe and Japanmore and more transnational corporations with headquarters in developing countries are emerging. In particular, Chinese, Taiwanese, Korean, and Indian corporations are thriving and thus dispersing the global concentration of economic power. Finally, a sign for a growing transnationality of corporations can be seen in the recent trend to incorporate as a "Societas Europaea" (SE)-a corporation under European Union law. 56 Although many experts predicted that the SE mechanism would have no future because of the lack of substantial legal advantages over the domestic forms of corporations of the Member States, 57 hundreds of corporations have been reincorporated under the European charter. 58 A 2008 telephone survey conducted with individuals involved in the incorporation decisions of German SEs revealed that the "European image of the SE" 59 was named most often as one of the principal motives for that choice. 60 Thus, it seems that-at least in Germany-it became chic to appear at the market in a legal form which is decoupled from the company's homecountry.
IV. THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SYMPOSIUM
Against this background, the authors of this volume reflect upon the trend toward the transnationalization of corporations as well as its potential repercussions affecting law, the state, and society in general.
The volume starts with Gunther Teubner discussing the quality of transnational corporations as self-constitutionalizing entities. Teubner analyzes the relationship between private and public corporate codes of conduct. His starting point is the paradox that-despite the fact that transnational corporations are responsible for serious ecological catastrophes, human rights violations, and growing corruption-binding state regulations do not effectively restrict the behavior of these companies. Rather, transnational corporations' "voluntary" codes of conduct emerge as a new species of transnational regimes. Those norms, Teubner argues, are of constitutional quality because they serve both constitutive (facilitative) and limitative (regulative) functions. On the one hand, the interplay between public and private actors aimed at liberalized world markets has created constitutional norms "which positivize private property, contractual freedom, competition, and human rights as transnational public policy." 61 On the other hand, codes of conduct can serve the function of limiting the extent of the transnational corporations' power and influence. While international organizations have established some codes of conduct, these codes rooted in the system of nation-states-surprisingly-do not exercise binding force. However, Teubner identifies codes of conduct brought forward by transnational corporations themselves that are binding and enforced by effective sanctions. While state-created law usually is associated with "hard law" and private self-regulation with "soft law," this correlation does not pertain when assessing international codes of conduct. Rather, in the context of these international codes of conduct, state law is "soft" and privately made law is "hard," thereby inverting the hierarchy of the states over corporations. Nevertheless, Teubner clarifies, public codes of conduct are far from meaningless: as external factors, they influence transnational corporations in their process of self-regulation. In the form of an ultracycle, the public influences the private indirectly by putting forward public expectations that transnational corporations should take into consideration in their very own interest.
In the next contribution, Sarianna Lundan scrutinizes the importance of transnational corporations to the development of institutions supporting global exchange. While the predominant internalization and transaction cost theories emphasize the function of corporations to provide legal certainty for internal transactions within the corporate structure, Lundan primarily takes into account the recent phenomenon of growing external relationships of transnational corporations. Because of the increasing use of contractual partnerships, she emphasizes its coordinating role over the role of ownership of assets. Against this background, Lundan develops her main argument that the growing number of external contractual market relations of transnational corporations simultaneously leads to better institutions for third parties operating in the market. Lundan's claim is that "[f]irms shape markets rather than the other way around, since firms introduce new routines, and because of the role they play in redefining the rules of selection in their operating environment." She argues that, while in former times organizational know-how was isolated within corporate structures, spillover effects in new modes of network businesses transfer institutional expertise to outsiders. Thus, transnational corporations help developing markets become "thicker," making institutional knowledge available for use in other market relations and consequently lowering the transaction costs of using the market. Lundan's approach is a step toward a better theoretical understanding of the institutional role transnational corporations play beyond the classical perception of the market-hierarchy dichotomy.
In the following article, Peter Muchlinski touches on the urgency to adapt corporate law to the needs of the post-financial crisis era. As a starting point, he analyzes how corporate law has influenced the neoliberal vogue of deregulating and facilitating the actions of transnational corporations by disregarding the interest of the public or third party, nonvoluntary creditors. He further shows how the lift of financial markets and tariff barriers, the sole focus on shareholder interests, and the liberal tendencies in both World Trade Organization (WTO) laws and bilateral investment treaties have led to irresponsible risk-taken at the expense of the public. Muchlinski identifies the lack of liability and accountability as the core of a concept of "asocial corporations," calling for a reorientation toward a concept of a "socialised corporation" that allows for a compromise between facilitation and accountability. To steer toward this concept by means of corporate law, he presents both private initiatives and public options. First, he discusses the potential of private claims for "foreign direct liability," addressing the abuse of the concept of limited liability. He underlines the power of civil society groups forming claims against transnational corporations, holding the well-capitalized parent company responsible for torts committed by an undercapitalized subsidiary. Second, Muchlinski calls for the public to put moral pressure on corporations to shift from the shareholder value model toward a stakeholder orientation. Third, in addition to these "bottom-up" approaches, he proposes a "top-down" approach, obliging nation-states to protect weaker social groups and individuals from irresponsible corporate power by means of a socially balanced international economic law. Muchlinski sees the return of direct state involvement in business, as can be observed in the banking industry or in the uprising corporations from the BRIC states-Brazil, Russia, India, and Chinaas the first sign of this protection obligation. In addition, he calls for nation-states to actively promote the concept of the social corporation by making a social business concept a necessary condition for being granted state-based export guarantees. Furthermore, he proposes including corporate social obligations as part of future bilateral investment treaties. Thus, Muchlinski puts forward innovative measures both on the national and transnational level in order to resocialize the function of the corporation as an inevitable reaction to the current economic crisis.
In the next contribution, Horst Eidenmüller addresses the connection between the transnational law market, regulatory competition, and transnational corporations. He first shows how the law has recently become increasingly perceived as a commodity. After discussing the famous Delaware effect, Eidenmüller describes how markets for law have shifted toward the international level, how individuals and companies seek attractive legal regulations, and how countries compete to meet the growing demand. Eidenmüller's central focus of analysis is on the special position of transnational corporations in the global law market, concentrating on company law, contract law, dispute resolution law, and insolvency law. He points out that in contrast to individual actors or small and medium-sized enterprises, transnational corporations are fully rational repeat players. Because of economies of scale, their cost-benefit position translates into superior choice incentives when engaging in the transnational law market. For the large number of contractual relationships within and surrounding transnational corporations, private ordering is an attractive option, bringing forth "private constitutions" through codes of conduct and contracting standardization. Thus, statutory law protecting public interests is frequently circumvented. Also, as transnational corporations enjoy more flexibility and bargaining power, they can exercise enormous influence, especially on small and mid-sized countries. Consequently, Eidenmüller discusses whether a special regulatory framework for transnational corporations should be imposed. In spite of transnational corporations' special position in the transnational law market, Eidenmüller concludes that a peculiar regulatory regime would not be suitable. Rather, he points out how traditional regulatory instruments and the existing governance framework could be employed to successfully accomplish this regulatory task.
Picking up on the subject of transnational private governance, Larry Catá Backer uses the G-20's Financial Stability Board (FSB) as a vehicle to discuss future options of linking state and nonstate governance. In Backer's view, the traditional state-centered organization of governance on the international level is an outdated model unable to cope with the complex coordination of nation-states and private actors at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Thus, the main goal of his article is to analyze whether it is possible to detect a basic template for transnational governance of economic activity, in general, and corporations, in particular, developing through principles of transnational private governance. He examines the organization of communities of states through the normative lens of private transnational governance and scrutinizes the importance of communication-structural coupling-between evolving private governance systems and emerging transnational public governance systems. He forecasts a dissolution of the borders between hard and soft law and a functional convergence of public and private governance in which the private corporation is concerned with public obligations and the regulatory state participates in markets. Backer argues that the G-20's FSB presents a model for such a new governance structure, leaving central competences to the nation-states but sharing central positions with private actors. The FSB is a system based on the governance within enterprises, regardless of whether those enterprises are states or private corporations. The forms of governance employed in the FSB are characterized by a soft, indirect diffusion of power, supported by the pressure of surveillance, which ironically bear resemblance to the modalities of governance within the supply chain of large multinationals. Thus, Backer demonstrates that governance models exist beyond the traditional private-public divide that are suitable for the growing transnational interrelations.
In the subsequent article, Karsten Nowrot takes another step toward a profound legal assessment of transnational corporations by discussing their role as steering subjects in international economic law. While the growing economic importance of transnational corporations is hard to overlook, their function as active players in legal matters has so far been outside the focus of academic attention. Looking at both the role of transnational corporations as steering subjects in WTO-law and international investment law, Nowrot distinguishes different modes of participation. Whereas, in the WTO case, transnational corporations are able to impose their participation in the lawmaking and dispute settlement process by means of indirect political influence and lobbyism only, the role of transnational corporations in international investment law is more central, as they are allowed to directly participate as parties of investment contracts or as parties to international investment arbitration cases. As a consequence of the proceeding globalization process, which, according to Nowrot, leads the way toward a transnational economic community, he calls for further approaches to integrate transnational corporations into the international legal process. He then proposes measures to guarantee inclusiveness, transparency, and responsibility as the legal core of a future concept of an international economic law community.
In the last section, Gralf-Peter Calliess and Jens Mertens treat the relation between state-created private law and competition policy on the international plane. They criticize the so-called "more economic approach" to European competition law for disregarding the importance of a functional system of private law. Based on the availability of market governance as an alternative mode for organizing transactions, it is often presumed that vertical integration is economically efficient. However, since the enforcement of cross-border contracts by stateorganized systems of private law is insufficient when it comes to crossborder transactions, "make or buy" decisions in international commerce are prejudiced against arms' length transactions on markets. Consequently, international transactions are integrated vertically into firm structures to a higher degree than comparable domestic transactions organized in the shadow of workable domestic private law. The resulting over-integration of world markets leads to reduced competitive incentives and high bureaucratic costs. Therefore, contrary to the fundamental assumptions of the "more economic approach," vertical integration does not per se foster consumer welfare in the global economy. However, as this over-integration is a reasonable reaction to the deficits in state protection of cross-border contracts, it cannot be countered by a strict world antitrust law without suppressing crossborder exchange. Thus, Calliess and Mertens stress that international private law policy establishing legal certainty in the enforcement of cross-border contracts currently seems to be the instrument of choice in promoting competition in the global economy.
